



**TradeRES**

New Markets Design & Models for  
100% Renewable Power Systems

# System adequacy in ~ 100% vRES Power Systems

Final Webinar | November 19<sup>th</sup> 2024

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This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 864276



# Motivation

- Few scarcity prices due to price caps, limited demand flexibility
- Low hedging levels due to risk aversion, random curtailment
- Too many uncertainties: policy interventions, demand increase, fuel, CO2 prices, weather...


## Research Questions:

- Can an Energy-Only-Market enable resource adequacy?
- How should a Capacity Remuneration Mechanism should be designed?

### Capacity mechanism type

- Market-wide - central buyer
- Market-wide - decentralised obligation
- No capacity mechanism
- Strategic reserves
- Targeted capacity payment

\*\* TBD



*ACER security of supply 2022*

# Co-simulation of 2 Agent-Based Model



AMIRIS

- Dispatch (hourly)
- More flexibility types
- vRES support policies
- No investment decisions

EMLabpy




- Investment and decommission
  - NPV > 0
  - Myopic
  - No guaranteed equilibrium
- CRMs

Case Study: NL 2050






# Can an EOM enable resource adequacy in a ~100% RES system ?







I. Sanchez-Jimenez, D. Ribo-Perez, M. Cvetkovic, J. Kochems, C. Schimeczek, L. de Vries. [Can an energy only market enable resource adequacy in a decarbonized power system? A co-simulation with two agent-based-models.](#) Applied Energy 2024

# Would companies invest to ensure reliability?



Low  
Median  
High




Weather uncertainty increased the variability of electricity prices by 10X and of cost recovery by 3X.

I. Sanchez-Jimenez, D. Ribo-Perez, M. Cvetkovic, J. Kochems, C. Schimeczek, L. de Vries. [Can an energy only market enable resource adequacy in a decarbonized power system? A co-simulation with two agent-based-models.](#) Applied Energy 2024



# Capacity Market

- Risk of overestimating derating factors of batteries and vRES, these were stable after 15 years
- Target capacity can be easily under or over-dimensioned
- Lower wholesale market costs, and similar costs to consumers as an EOM




Source: Sanchez-Jimenez, Bruninx, de Vries. [Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms for a Decarbonized Power System 2024](#)



# Strategic Reserve

- Increased lifetime of plants in reserve, i.e. H2 turbines
- High electricity price volatility, because DSR was activated more
- The cost of the reserve was zero in the median case





Source: Sanchez-Jimenez, Bruninx, de Vries. [Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms for a Decarbonized Power System 2024](#)





# Capacity Subscription

Consumers subscribe to the capacity they need during scarcity events  
Enables reliability to become a private good




- Consumers adapt their bids based on the experienced shortages
- Generators make investments based on last year's CS price





# Capacity Subscription

- Volatile and high capacity prices
- Investment waves due to myopic bids from consumers and myopic investments
- Clawback reduced cost to consumers by 1 Eur/MWh



Source: Sanchez-Jimenez, Bruninx, de Vries. [Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms for a Decarbonized Power System 2024](#)

# Conclusions

- A capacity market reduce shortages most effectively
- Requires central parametrization, can easily be oversized
- Possibility for long-term contracts
- Strategic Reserve extends power plants' lifetimes
- It can incentivize more flexible generators.
- Its activation after DSR disturbs the merit order and can make electricity prices more volatile.
- Capacity subscription is a self-regulated mechanism that reveals the need for capacity and incentivizes more demand flexibility.
- Investment cycles may occur.
- Requires guidance from retailers
- A single buyer of long-term contracts may be needed.
- Hydrogen storage may also require a CRM.

	EOM	CM	SR	CS
Limiting shortages	Red	Green	Orange	Green
Reducing total system costs	Yellow	Green	Light Green	Light Green
Reducing costs to consumers	Yellow	Orange	Red	Orange
Revenue certainty for investors	Red	Green	Orange	Light Green
Prevents under/oversizing	Light Green	Orange	Orange	Light Green
Reducing electricity price volatility	Yellow	Green	Red	Light Green
Incentivizing demand response	Light Green	Orange	Green	Green

Sanchez-Jimenez, Bruninx, de Vries. [Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms for a Decarbonized Power System 2024](#)



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## Questions or Comments?

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